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I.

INTRODUCTION

“Life is messy and full of compounding consequences.”1
Although environmental law professor Sanne Knudsen was writing
about the cumulative public health risk of exposure to chemicals and
pesticides,2 these words could just as easily apply to the various public
† Assistant Professor of Legal Writing, St. John’s University School of Law.
Ph.D. 2014, Columbia University; J.D. 2004, Harvard Law School; B.A. 2001, The
George Washington University.
1. See Sanne H. Knudsen, Regulating Cumulative Risk, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2313,
2314 (2017).
2.
[R]egulatory safety standards need to consider the public health
implications not from any single chemical but from the
combination of multiple chemicals with common mechanisms of
toxicity. It is the potential for combined and synergistic harm that
needs attention. In fact, so important is this need that the failure
to systematize the considerations of cumulative risk may amount
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health risks managed by healthcare organizations. Little is known
about the cumulative risk for healthcare organizations.3
Any attempt to assess and manage cumulative risk within
healthcare organizations raises similar issues to those involved with
managing risks individually. For example, it is not always clear what
the consequences of inappropriate staff behavior or a cybersecurity
breach will be in the real world given the many contingent
factors—including the type and number of patients affected, the
speed at which the risk is contained, and any redress made to the
patients and staff members affected.4 These uncertainties arising
from individual risks force those who need to prepare for and reduce
predictable risks to make assumptions about human behavior.5
However, assessing cumulative risk in healthcare organizations
presents an additional layer of uncertainty. In assessing cumulative
risk, we need to evaluate whether the timing of events (and the order
in which they occur) matters when assessing their potential
cumulative impact.6 Further, the response to the first incident may
affect the consequences of, or response to, the second.7 Finally, the
possibility of multiple system failures may affect both an
organization’s response and the behavior of patients and staff
members.8
In spite of the uncertainties, this article draws on cumulative risk
assessment methodology developed by the field of environmental
to ‘arbitrary and capricious’ decision-making.
Id. at 2320.
3. See, e.g., Dan Moskowitz, The Importance of Healthcare Risk Management,
INVESTOPEDIA (July 23, 2015, 10:20 AM), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/
personal-finance/072315/importance-healthcare-risk-management.asp [https://
perma.cc/UG4D-SQDJ] (describing prudent healthcare risk management as a
prioritization of individual risks based on their likelihood and potential severity).
4. See id. at 2333. Professor Knudsen describes “model[ing] real-world
exposure scenarios” to understand the risk presented by chemicals. Id. Modeling
the impact of specified risks is made more difficult by “informational challenges.”
See id. at 2335–43 (noting the need to understand “exposure pathways, how
frequently people are exposed, [and] concentrations at which exposed” to manage
cumulative chemical risks).
5. Id. at 2336.
6. See id. at 2335 (“[T]iming of exposures to various chemicals may matter
because exposure to one chemical may make an individual or community more
susceptible to a later in time exposure to a second chemical.”).
7. See id.
8. See id. at 2335–38.
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regulation and adapts it to the healthcare context.9 This article first
examines the increasing prominence of cumulative risk in
environmental law, where the quantity and variety of chemicals and
pollutants have highlighted the need to address the interaction of
different environmental hazards.10 The article then discusses how
current risk assessments by healthcare organizations are too
segmented in that they view risks in isolation or evaluate multiple
risks based on a simple additive principle—the harm associated with
the cumulative risk is the sum of the damage of each individual risk
had it occurred in isolation.11 Next, this article addresses the
importance of cumulative risk assessments for healthcare
organizations.12 Recent natural disasters and mass casualty events13
show that assessing simultaneous and interacting risks is imperative
to making health organizations safer for patients and staff. Finally,
this article proposes adopting the same framework used in the
environmental context for evaluating cumulative risk in the
healthcare context.14
II. CUMULATIVE ENVIROMENTAL RISK
In environmental law and regulation, cumulative risk means
“[t]he combined risks from aggregate exposures to multiple agents
or stressors.”15 Cumulative risk assessments are not simply lists of all
individual risks that a population faces.16 Instead, they “study how
various stressors interact with one another and impact the given
population when considered in combination.”17 The impact of
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Parts III.A–III.B.
12. See infra Parts III.C–III.D.
13. See generally Deborah Simmons, The Greeks Have a Word for What Happened in
Las Vegas, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2017/oct/2/las-vegas-shooting-one-in-a-string-of-mass-casualt [https://perm
a.cc/S3JJ-KQQA] (providing a list of recent mass casualty events); The
Deadliest Natural Disasters of 2017, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 3, 2017, 8:00 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/stem-awards/design/deadliest-natural-dis
asters [https://perma.cc/CH5K-5RFM] (providing a list of recent natural
disasters).
14. See infra Part IV.
15. RISK ASSESSMENT FORUM, EPA, FRAMEWORK FOR CUMULATIVE RISK
ASSESSMENT 72 (2003).
16. Id. at xvii–xx; Knudsen, supra note 1, at 2324–25.
17. Knudsen, supra note 1, at 2324–25.

1286

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:4

multiple risks can be additive or synergistic.18 In fact, cumulative risk
assessments may not even be quantitative, depending on the
stressors and the data available.19
Cumulative risk assessments in environmental regulation look
beyond the direct impact of something like a chemical exposure to
other effects such as stress, which can worsen the impact a chemical
has on a population.20 As with much of health law (and its increasing
focus on the social determinants of health), cumulative risk
assessments focus on populations instead of individuals.21 The
assessments can evaluate the way different chemicals impact
populations through a single exposure route (e.g., drinking water)
or multiple exposure routes.22 They can evaluate one outcome or
multiple, interactive outcomes.23 Cumulative risk assessments can
even assess how stressors impact particular subpopulations that may
be more vulnerable.24
A.

Building Consensus

In recent years, environmental law scholars and regulators have
agreed that cumulative risk assessment is a useful tool in the
protection of the public from chemical exposures.25 One example is
18. Id. at 2325 (identifying additive interactions as including instances where
“the total risk can be calculated by adding up the individual risks posed by each of
the chemicals over all identifiable exposure pathways,” and defining synergistic
interactions as “more complicated” than additive interactions and as including
situations where “two or more stressors combine [in] such [a way] that the
combination of stressors is worse than the impact of the individual stressors simply
added together”); Ken Sexton, Cumulative Risk Assessment: An Overview of
Methodological Approaches for Evaluating Combined Health Effects from Exposure to Multiple
Environmental Stressors, 9 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 370, 371 (2012) (“The
potential for interactions among mixture constituents to produce synergistic effects
is well known (e.g., increased risk of lung cancer from combined exposure to
tobacco smoke and radon) . . . .”).
19. See RISK ASSESSMENT FORUM, supra note 15, at xvii, 7–9.
20. Id. (“[Additive or synergistic] stressors need not be chemical; they can also
be physical, biological, or social.”).
21. Id. (“[P]erhaps the most important conceptual feature of cumulative risk
assessments is their focus on population-level analysis.”).
22. See id. at 2 n.1.
23. Knudsen, supra note 1, at 2326.
24. See id. at 2327.
25. See Sexton, supra note 18, at 371 (“It is becoming apparent, however, that a
more holistic approach is necessary if risk assessment is to remain a relevant and
reliable decision-making tool.”); see also Knudsen, supra note 1, at 2323–24 (“[T]he
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the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996’s requirement that the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) focus on the
cumulative risk of chemical exposures.26
The EPA set out its Framework for Cumulative Risk Assessment
(“Framework”) in May 2003.27 The Framework is not binding,
although it may serve as a basis for future regulation.28 The EPA
admitted that not all suggestions are applicable to each analysis and
that “[f]or some areas . . . the methodology for conducting the risk
analysis may not yet exist.”29 In fact, the data needs of many
cumulative risk assessments may mean that the “identification of
critical information and research needs may be the primary result of
many cumulative risk assessment endeavors.”30
The Framework sets forth three phases to a cumulative risk
assessment: “(1) planning, scoping, and problem formulation, (2)
analysis, and (3) risk characterization.”31 In the first phase, risk
managers and stakeholders set out the goals and the scope of the
assessment by producing a conceptual model and an analysis plan.32
The conceptual model determines the stressors and/or impacts to
be assessed, and the relationships between the stressors and their
impacts.33 The analysis plan sets forth the data needed, how to obtain
it, and the expected end point.34 Next, the analysis phase determines
likely exposures and interactions among stressors, “predicting risks
to the population or populations assessed.”35 Finally, in the risk
characterization phase, the significance of the risks are put into
context and, after considering any assumptions and missing data,

National Research Council’s 2009 Report . . . warned that risk assessments are
themselves at risk of becoming irrelevant unless they start accounting for cumulative
impacts.”).
26. See RISK ASSESSMENT FORUM, supra note 15, at x-xi (“Assessing cumulative
risk through complex exposures is one of the Agency’s high priorities, especially in
light of FQPA mandates.”).
27. Id. at x.
28. Id. at xvii (“Although this framework report will serve as a foundation for
developing future guidelines, it is neither a procedural guide nor a regulatory
requirement within EPA, and it is expected to evolve with experience.”).
29. Id. at xi.
30. Id. at xii.
31. Id. at xviii.
32. Id. at 14–15.
33. Id. at 24.
34. Id. at 28–29.
35. Id. at xviii.
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determine the reliability of the assessment.36 As summarized by the
Framework:
Because of the limitations of current science, cumulative
risk assessments done in the near future will not be able to
adequately answer all the questions posed by stakeholders
or interested parties. This does not mean, however, that
they cannot answer some of the questions; in fact,
cumulative risk assessment may be the best tool available to
address certain questions dealing with multiple-stressor
impacts.37
The EPA has devoted substantial resources towards promoting
cumulative risk assessments and researching models of exposure to
multiple stressors.38
Methods for assessing cumulative risk in the environmental
context can be roughly divided into stressor-based methods for
chemical exposures and effects-based methods from the interaction
of chemical and nonchemical stressors.39 Stressor-based methods
ask, “what health effects are related to a defined set of stressors,”
while effects-based methods ask, “retrospectively . . . which stressors
explain observed or hypothesized health effects in a population or
community.”40 While varying frameworks for implementing these
methods have been proposed, “[t]he reality is that quantitative
analyses are impractical in the context of many real-world problems
because data on interactions among environmental stressors are
scarce, information on place- and population-specific exposures is
lacking, and verified mechanistic models relating exposure to effect
are unavailable.”41
36. Id. at xviii.
37. Id. at xx.
38. See Knudsen, supra note 1, at 2339–41. Some lessons learned from the EPA’s
work include “the iterative nature of CRAs, importance of considering vulnerability,
need for stakeholder engagement, value of a tiered approach, new methods to assess
multiroute exposures to chemical mixtures, and the impact of geographical scale
on approach and purpose.” Sarah Gallagher et al., Cumulative Risk Assessment Lessons
Learned: A Review of Case Studies and Issue Papers, 120 CHEMOSPHERE 697, 697 (2015).
Tiered approaches can help screen out stressors of limited impact, focusing the
assessment on higher priorities. Id. at 701. However, there must be a reason for
screening out a particular stressor and there must be attempts “[t]o prevent
stressors from being screened out inappropriately.” Id. Using conservative screening
criteria can ensure that all important risks are analyzed. Id.
39. Sexton, supra note 18, at 379.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 381.
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Instead, some have proposed focusing on “evaluation of risk
management options instead of characterization of problems.”42
Benefits of this approach include a focus on environmental justice
for vulnerable populations and the need to analyze quantitatively
only a small group of stressors relevant to the cost/benefit analysis
for decision making.43 Yet the difficulty in assessing cumulative
exposure to multiple varying stressors remains.
B.

Legal and Administrative Failures

The promise of cumulative risk assessments has largely gone
unfulfilled despite a growing consensus on the importance of such
assessments.44 Some of the delay relates to the difficulties in
conducting cumulative risk assessments. The EPA assumes that the
impacts of stressors are additive because the synergistic impact is
unknown or incalculable because of many uncertainties.45 The
impact of stressors in the real world, instead of in models,
incorporates many variables and assumptions that make the model
unreliable at times.46 A model is only as good as its inputs, and
cumulative risk assessments require knowledge about the effects of
stressors in combinations that may not be available.47 The timing and
order of multiple exposures to stressors can also change the impact,
assuming that one can make the impact of the others worse or
perhaps mitigate the effects.48
The EPA does not regularly consider cumulative risks. Although
it has issued guidelines, these remain “voluntary and informational
measures.”49 Yet, if cumulative risk is difficult for experts to calculate,
42. Id. (“[S]tressors would only be included in the cumulative risk assessment
to the degree that they influence the estimated benefits of a control option either
in its estimation or interpretation.”).
43. Id.
44. See generally Knudsen, supra note 1.
45. Id. at 2332–33.
46. See id. at 2333, 2337 (“Because the goal of cumulative risk assessments is
ultimately to model real-world exposure scenarios, understanding what happens to
chemicals when released into the environment is an expected part of the assessment
process.”).
47. Id. at 2335–56 (“Even if researchers are confident in the theoretical
models—e.g., choosing additive interactions over synergistic—the confidence in the
ultimate assessment will be a function of the quality of the data inputs to the
theoretical models.”).
48. Id. at 2334.
49. Id. at 2342 (“Within EPA program offices, there is no agency-wide policy
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individuals in the public will not be able to accurately assess
cumulative risk.50 Even if individuals could accurately assess risk
in the environmental context, they “cannot opt out of
exposure to toxins.”51 Finally, vulnerable populations may suffer
disproportionately from the cumulative risks of chemical exposure.52
The lack of regulation based on cumulative risk is a result of statutory
deficiencies, failures in implementation, and court decisions that
hold regulators to an impossible standard when attempting to ban
or limit the use of particular chemicals and prioritize economic
impact over health impact.53 To move forward, decisions need to be
made about which stressors to regulate and how to do so. Assuming
decision-makers can somehow reach agreement that a cumulative
risk is “unreasonable,” the question then becomes which component
risk to regulate and how to do so.54

for considering cumulative risks when making environmental decisions.”).
50. Id. at 2353–55.
51. Id. at 2355 (“The existing regulatory regime—which for decades has left
open the toggle switch for chemicals entering the marketplace and
environment—has created public health externalities that require collective
regulatory action to resolve.”).
52. Id. at 2362–64 (discussing the four reasons for vulnerability—“exposure,
susceptibility, preparedness, and responsiveness” and noting that “poor nutrition,
noise, obesity, or psychosocial stress can impact a body’s ability to recover from
harmful exposures” and “[n]ot every family has the means to buy organic foods or
move to a neighborhood with cleaner water”); Sexton, supra note 18, at 374 (“There
is mounting concern that exclusive focus on chemicals is overly narrow, needlessly
restrictive, and clearly inadequate to address the totality of cumulative health risks
from people’s real-world exposures to a diverse and dynamic combination of both
chemical and nonchemical stressors. Consequently, efforts are underway to develop
approaches and methods that incorporate nonchemical stressors, especially
psychosocial factors (e.g., low income, meager education, substandard diet, unsafe
neighborhoods, dilapidated housing, lack of access to health care), into cumulative
risk assessments.”).
53. See Knudsen, supra note 1, at 2366–85.
54. Id. at 2393–94 (suggesting that decisions could be made “on the basis of
several factors: which chemical is most toxic, the volume of the chemical in
commerce, the usefulness of the chemical to social life, or the chemical that was the
first to enter the marketplace . . . [perhaps giving] priority to the chemicals that are
well studied”).
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III. RISKS FOR HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS
A “risk assessment” is an analysis of the likelihood that a
particular event will occur.55 It is “a process whereby the magnitude
of a specific risk is characterized so that decision makers can
conclude whether the potential hazard is sufficiently great that it
needs to be managed or regulated” and how to do so effectively.56
Most environmental and health risk assessments focus on reducing
risk to levels “as low as reasonably achievable,” or “ALARA,” because
they recognize that few risks can be reduced to zero through
management and regulation.57
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 require risk
assessments related to the protection of patient information as well
as corporate fraud.58 Hospitals and other healthcare providers
typically focus on risks identified by the United States Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General
(OIG), Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), and the
Department of Justice (DOJ)—from regulations, laws, and
investigations.59 Most of this guidance focuses on claims and billing.60
55. See Dennis J. Paustenbach, Retrospective on U.S. Health Risk Assessment: How
Others Can Benefit, 6 RISK: HEALTH SAFETY & ENV’T 283, 283 (1995) (“As broadly
defined, risk assessment can be used to predict the likelihood of many unwanted
events, including industrial explosions, workplace injuries, failures of machine
parts, natural catastrophes, injury or death from an array of voluntary activities,
diseases, natural causes, life-style or others.”).
56. Id. at 287–88.
57. Id. at 288.
58. See DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., GUIDANCE ON RISK ANALYSIS (2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/guidance/guidance-risk-a
nalysis/index.html [https://perma.cc/C2DX-V95Q] (“Risk analysis is the first step
in an organization’s Security Role compliance efforts.”); TIM J. LEECH, SARBANESOXLEY SECTIONS 302 & 404: A WHITE PAPER PROPOSING PRACTICAL, COST EFFECTIVE
COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES 39 (Carddecisions, Inc. ed. 2003), https://www.sec.gov/
rules/proposed/s74002/card941503.pdf [https://perma.cc/CBF4-E9NN] (discussing the requirement of risk assessment processes at both a micro and macro level).
59. See, e.g., GLEN C. MUELLER, PERFORMING A COMPLIANCE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR
COMPLIANCE AUDITING & MONITORING IN HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS 3,
https://www.ahia.org/assets/Uploads/pdfUpload/WhitePapers/Article2Risk-Asse
ssment.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3MD-WC6T] (providing a list of categories
compliance officers should consider when conducting a risk assessment, including
information concerning the OIG, CMS, and DOJ).
60. See Michelle Ann Richards, Risk Assessment: Why You Need It and How to Get
Started, HEALTHCARE BUS. MGMT. ASS’N (July 6, 2015), https://www.hbma.org/
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Compliance efforts within healthcare organizations are meant
to prevent “fraud, abuse and waste” while the organization provides
high-quality healthcare to all patients.61 Not all “fraud, abuse and
waste” is financial.62 The focus on financial fraud largely results from
the easy availability of data and ability to quantitatively assess risk.63
Regulatory bodies appear to focus their resources on these areas
while avoiding other new and increasing risks that are difficult to
quantify or manage.64 However, while claims and billing issues may
be important subjects for cumulative risk assessments, they should
not be the only subjects.
Health organizations should also include accelerators in their
risk assessments. Accelerators are sudden, intense events within
healthcare facilities that are unexpected, cause patient care to
deviate sharply from patient and provider expectations, and have the
potential to operate synergistically with other such events and more
routine risks.65 I term such events “accelerators” because they can
increase the magnitude or likelihood of other potential risk events.
For patients, these events occur at a vulnerable time when their
reactions may be heightened due to the nature of their position
seeking care.
news/public-news/n_risk-assessment [https://perma.cc/944V-288E].
61. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969–72 (Del.
Ch. 1996) (finding that failure to implement a compliance program may constitute
a breach of a corporate Director’s fiduciary duties); Publication of the OIG
Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 63 Fed. Reg. 8987, 8987–88 (Feb. 23,
1998) (“Fundamentally, compliance efforts are designed to establish a culture
within a hospital that promotes prevention, detection and resolution of instances of
conduct that do not conform to Federal and State law, and Federal, State and private
payor health care program requirements, as well as the hospital’s ethical and
business policies.”).
62. See James D. Byrd, Jr. et al., Health Care Fraud: An Introduction to a Major Cost
Issue, 14 J. ACCT., ETHICS, & PUB. POL’Y 521, 522 (2013) (“While fraud is typically
discussed in financial terms, some health care industry frauds have an element that
is not present in frauds affecting most other industries, i.e., individuals’ health and
lives may be affected.”).
63. See generally Hossein Joudaki et al., Using Data Mining to Detect Health Care
Fraud and Abuse: A Review of Literature, 7 GLOBAL J. HEALTH SCI. 194, 195–99 (2015)
(discussing how electronic health records and other computer systems simplify the
process of detecting fraud).
64. See Byrd et al., supra note 62, at 523 (“These frauds are not easily identified
or quantified.”).
65. Cf. ACE Group, 11 Critical Risks Facing the Healthcare Industry, RISK & INS.
(June 1, 2015), http://riskandinsurance.com/11-critical-risks-facing-the-health
care-industry/ [https://perma.cc/D4EF-UAMN].
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Shifting the focus of risk assessments to include accelerators will
require an acceptance of uncertainties and information gaps.66
While “[n]ot all risks are equal, and not all need to be remediated,”67
all should be understood. A conscious decision must be made about
whether and how to address them. The consequences of risk
reduction in one area may not even be known. It is possible that
when one risk is decreased, another may increase.68 The answer is
not, however, to ignore risks that are difficult to evaluate.
This section discusses the four main categories of risk outside of
the financial fraud and negligence that health organizations
currently focus on.69 Next, this section explains why evaluating each
of these risks in isolation or as merely one risk among others is
insufficient.70 Finally, this section provides two examples of
accelerators and then considers ways in which the healthcare
community can build consensus about the need for such assessments
as the environmental regulation community has done.71
A.

Defining the Risks

Although the identification of risks is the first step of most risk
assessments,72 this article is not focused on providing an exhaustive
list of possible risks faced by healthcare organizations.73 Instead, it
66. Cf. Uncertainty and Variability, EPA EXPOBOX, https://www.epa.gov/
expobox/uncertainty-and-variability [https://perma.cc/9UPP-BWNY] (last visited
May 2, 2018) (discussing uncertainty in exposure assessments conducted by the
EPA).
67. Cornelia Dorfschmid & Steven D. Forman, Meeting the Challenge of Adequately
Addressing Numerous Compliance Risks: A Systematic Approach for Managing Multiple
Compliance Risks All at Once, 15 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 19, 20, 22 (2013).
68. Mark Eliot Shere, The Myth of Meaningful Environmental Risk Assessment, 19
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 471 (1995) (“For example, EPA engaged in an extensive
quantitative risk assessment to evaluate the health risks from asbestos brake linings
for cars. The agency concluded that the asbestos in the linings would cause a loss of
over 102 ‘discounted’ lives from cancer, and proceeded to ban the use of such
linings. The agency refused to consider, however, that alternative brake linings
might have a higher failure rate, killing even more people in the resulting traffic
accidents.”).
69. See infra Part III.A.
70. See infra Part III.B.
71. See infra Parts III.C–III.D.
72. See Dorfschmid & Forman, supra note 67 (recommending a nine-step
process to risk assessment by healthcare organizations).
73. Not all risks are identifiable. Many are so rare that they are not on
administrators’ radar screens or are considered too rare to be worth the cost of
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focuses on four of the biggest areas of risk—staffing risks, cyber risks,
short-term mass casualty emergencies, and long-term public health
crises—to demonstrate the need for cumulative risk assessments.
These four risks are currently receiving a significant and growing
amount of public attention, as each has a high likelihood of resulting
in substantial damage to an organization if it materializes.74 While
these particular risks illustrate the need for cumulative risk
assessments, the particular examples are less important than the
need to consider the risks together, as interactive stressors.75 What
follows is a discussion of some of those risks and how healthcare
organizations, even when attentive to these important categories of
risk, consider them in isolation.
The first issue is staffing risks. Staff at healthcare organizations
have all of the interpersonal difficulties of a typical working
environment magnified by the stressful context in which they work.76
This stress can manifest itself in inappropriate language or hostility
towards coworkers or patients.77 The negative behavior of health
organization staff also has a greater impact than other service
industries because of the uniquely vulnerable position of patients.78
At the most serious level, staffing concerns include the risk that
employees or former employees will harass or assault co-workers,
patients, or hospital visitors—or that these parties will harass or
assault employees.79 The consequences can include workers’
compensation claims, malpractice liability, reputational harm, and

managing. See id. at 19–20 (“Although risk issues and areas are often defined by
internal and external sources, many remain unknown or even unknowable at a
point in time.”).
74. Id. at 22 (“Assessing risk has three aspects: the probability that risk comes
true, the impact or damage to the organization if it happens, and the internal
controls already in place that mitigate such damage.”).
75. See id.
76. See The Top 10 Challenges Facing Healthcare Workers, BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Apr.
5, 2011), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-management-admini
stration/the-top-10-challenges-facing-healthcare-workers.html [https://perma.cc/
MEJ8-C76U].
77. See Joint Comm’n, Div. Health Care Improvement, Bullying Has No Place in
Health Care, 24 QUICK SAFETY 1, 1–2 (2016).
78. See id. at 2.
79. Id. at 3 (noting that the “incidence rate for violence and other injuries in
the healthcare and social assistance sector in 2012 was over three times greater than
the rate for all private industries”).
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increased costs associated with “staff retention, morale and
absenteeism.”80
The second issue is cyber security risks. By using electronic
medical records, the efficiency and accuracy of patient care has
increased, but so has the risk of a security breach.81 A 2014 study
estimates that cyber risks may cost a single healthcare facility $2.2
million over a two-year span and the entire healthcare industry about
$6.2 billion per year.82 With many employees and contractors
operating the recordkeeping system with the ability to access private
records, there is a high risk for potential leaks.83 As healthcare
providers increasingly use email and other electronic means to
communicate with patients, data concerns around telemedicine are
increasing.84
Among potential risks related to cyber security is the inability
for certain operations at healthcare organizations to function if they
are corrupted or held for ransom.85 Hackers using ransomware have
already attacked hospitals.86 The first known instance of a
ransomware attack on an American hospital occurred at the
Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center in California, where hackers
demanded $3.4 million and the hospital had to turn away patients
because its computers were offline for over a week.87 Some are

80. Id.
81. See generally Fouzia F. Ozair et al., Ethical Issues in Electronic Health Records: A
General Overview, 6 PERSP. CLINICAL RES. 73, 73–75 (2015) (discussing the benefits of
electronic health records and increased security risks).
82. PONEMON INST., SIXTH ANNUAL BENCHMARK STUDY ON PRIVACY & SECURITY OF
HEALTHCARE DATA, 1 (2016).
83. See, e.g., Ozair et al., supra note 81, at 74 (elaborating on an instance where
a healthcare employee abused her position as a hospital employee to access
confidential patient information and then sold that information).
84. See DIANE DOHERTY & RENEE CARINO, CRITICAL RISKS FACING THE
HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY 5–6 (2015), https://www2.chubb.com/microsites/_asse
ts/doc/healthcare-risk-collateral/chubb-healthcare-critical-risk-whitepaper.pdf [ht
tps://perma.cc/XTK7-UWTM].
85. Zachary T. Steadman, Ransomware and Healthcare Providers, 51 ARK. LAW. 20,
20–22 (2016).
86. Jessica Davis, Ransomware: See the 14 Hospitals Attacked So Far in 2016,
HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Oct. 5, 2016, 12:13 PM), http://www.healthcare
itnews.com/slideshow/ransomware-see-hospitals-hit-2016?page=1 [https://perm
a.cc/YAQ2-Z2YL].
87. Anthony Cuthbertson, Hospitals Are Critical Infrastructure ‘Most at Risk’ to ISIS
Hackers, NEWSWEEK (Oct 6, 2016, 10:07 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/hospitalsmost-risk-isis-hackers-506822 [https://perma.cc/48QP-RZ3J].
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speculating that terrorists may try to hack hospitals to spread fear
and to harm populations—not to seek money.88 Insurance and
security consultants can mitigate some of this risk but not all,
particularly as technology advances quickly and healthcare providers
struggle to keep up.89
The third issue is short-term mass casualty emergencies. A mass
casualty event can upend the usual business of emergency care.90
The need to provide care quickly to an unexpectedly large number
of patients can stretch resources and strain the mental health of
staff.91 Further, news media, law enforcement, and family members
all demand attention during these events.92 In some cases, the
facilities of the healthcare organization itself may suffer damage or
even require evacuation.93 The crucial decision about when and
whether to evacuate can have life and death consequences. Recently,

88. See id. (discussing how cybersecurity experts are concerned about terrorist
attacks on healthcare systems).
89. See Joshua R. Levenson, Note, Strength in Numbers: An Examination into the
Liability of Corporate Entities for Consumer and Employee Data Breaches, 19 U. FLA. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 95, 122–23 (2008); Lily Hay Newman, The Ransomware Meltdown
Experts Warned About Is Here, WIRED (May 12, 2017, 2:03 PM),
https://www.wired.com/2017/05/ransomware-meltdown-experts-warned/ [https:
//perma.cc/B4RK-S8R7] (“Hospitals make for popular ransomware victims
because they have an urgent need to restore service for their patients. They may
therefore be more likely to pay criminals to reinstate systems. They also often make
for relatively easy targets.”).
90. See, e.g., Frazer Maude, Impact of ‘Mass Casualty Events’ on Health Staff,
SKY NEWS (Oct. 26, 2017, 3:53 PM), https://news.sky.com/story/impact-of[https://perma.cc/DWL5-7PCF]
mass-casualty-events-on-health-staff-11098873
(explaining how several mass casualty events in England impacted local emergency
care facilities).
91. See id.; see also, e.g., Kenneth N. Ozoilo et al., Challenges of the Management of
Mass Casualty: Lessons Learned from the Jos Crisis of 2001, 8 WORLD J. EMERGENCY
SURGERY 1, 4 (2013) https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3819470/
pdf/1749-7922-8-44.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QVY-KLYG] (“Hospital personnel
who were trapped in the hospital for over 72 hours soon began to manifest features
of physical and mental stress. Overwork was a major factor, but in addition, there
was anxiety for personal safety, fear for the lives of loved ones, and worry over the
eventual outcome of the crisis.”).
92. See DOHERTY & CARINO, supra note 84, at 7–8.
93. Id. at 8; see also SHERI FINK, FIVE DAYS AT MEMORIAL: LIFE AND DEATH IN A
STORM-RAVAGED HOSPITAL (Crown Publishers ed., 2013) (describing patient deaths
over five days at Memorial Medical Center during and after Hurricane Katrina).
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residents of a Florida nursing home died after an air conditioner
failed and the facility did not evacuate.94
The fourth issue is the lack of resources of healthcare providers
due to long-term public health crises, such as the increase in the
percentage (and the decrease in age) of patients with chronic
conditions associated with obesity.95 Both staff members and patients
are more likely to be obese than ever before.96 Caring for obese
patients results in a disproportionate share of injuries to healthcare
workers and frequently requires special equipment.97 Obese
individuals also frequently have multiple health conditions
complicating their treatment.98 As a result, total hospital costs for
obese surgical patients are roughly 3.7 percent higher than for nonobese patients.99
B.

Isolationism

Today, most healthcare organizations analyze these risks, if at
all, in isolation. But what if the likelihood of each risk occurring
depends on whether another risk occurs? What if the severity of the
impact of one risk depends on whether another risk occurs? To
determine how these risks interact, consider an example. Imagine
94. See Ellen Gabler et al., At Florida Nursing Home, Many Calls for Help, but None
That Made a Difference, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/09/23/us/nursing-home-deaths.html [https://perma.cc/E5JP-D7ZE].
95. See Chronic Diseases and Conditions are on the Rise, PWC,
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/industries/healthcare/emerging-trends-pwc-health
care/chronic-diseases.html [https://perma.cc/D7XD-9BZ6] (last visited Apr. 3,
2018); Obesity Rates and Trends Overview, STATE OF OBESITY, https://stateof
obesity.org/obesity-rates-trends-overview/ [https://perma.cc/BV7 C-B5TX] (last
visited Apr. 3, 2018) [hereinafter Obesity Rates and Trends] (discussing the rising
trends in obesity rates).
96. See, e.g., Obesity Rates and Trends, supra note 95.
97. THOMAS H. WILSON, OSHA GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE FACILITIES ¶ 763 (2015)
(“A 2009 study . . . found that nearly 30 percent of staff injuries due to patient
handling were linked to working with a bariatric patient, even though such patients
constituted less than 10 percent of the facility’s patient population.”).
98. Id. (“In 2002, 25 percent of morbidly obese patients were treated for six or
more co-morbid conditions, such as diabetes, lipedema, lymphedema, skin
infections, joint disease, heart disease, incontinence and respiratory problems.”).
99. Joy Stephenson-Laws et al., Hospitals: The Biggest Losers in the Health Care
Debate, 28:6 WESTLAW J. INS. COVERAGE 1, 1 (Nov. 17, 2017) (arguing that the obesity
crisis will continue to challenge the finances of healthcare providers). Further,
Obese patients have more frequent hospitalizations, use more prescription
medications, and require more follow-up care than non-obese patients. Id. at 2.
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that the odds of an ice storm near a hospital are one in one
thousand. Then, imagine that the odds of a mass shooting near or at
the hospital are also one in one-thousand. The odds of these two rare
events taking place are then the result of multiplying the odds of
each event occurring by the other (1000 times 1000). So, the odds
of a mass shooting near or at the hospital during an ice storm are
one in one-million.100 Thus, the combined risk does not even seem
to merit consideration by risk managers and stakeholders of the
hospital.
But what if the odds of these two rare events occurring are
related? Suppose a mass shooter is looking to cause the most
destruction possible and waits until a deadly weather event to spread
terror. Then, the odds of having these two rare events occur at the
same time are not one in one-million because the risk of the deadly
shooting is contingent upon the occurrence of the ice storm. To
better manage these worrisome possibilities, healthcare risk assessors
should look toward other fields, such as environmental law, which
already use cumulative risk assessment.
C.

The Accelerators

Accelerators are events within healthcare facilities that shift the
standard expectations regarding patient care. They operate
synergistically to increase and even enhance other risks and should
therefore be a priority for cumulative risk assessments.
1. Staffing Risks
The United States faces a continuing shortage of nurses.101
Hospitals have responded by using temporary workers provided by
outside agencies (though this is expensive and tends to result in
lower quality care), creating internal systems for nurses to receive
higher levels of compensation for working extra hours, increasing

100. Shere, supra note 68, at 467 (giving the same example using a hailstorm
during the Super Bowl won by the Cleveland Browns to demonstrate the stacking
effect).
101. Rebecca Grant, The U.S. is Running Out of Nurses, ATLANTIC (Feb. 3,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/02/nursing-shortage/
459741/ [https://perma.cc/B5RY-QX9P].
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overall compensation, and investing in education and training for
new nurses.102 However, gaps in staffing remain.103
Gender discrimination and stereotyping are also unfortunately
far too common within the healthcare workplace.104 Pay and status
differentials between men and women in healthcare occupations
affect staff retention and morale.105 The impact of the #MeToo
movement on healthcare organizations is still unknown.
Additionally, patients who experience sexual harassment from
physicians sometimes file complaints with the controlling medical
board or sue their doctors.106
Similarly, racial discrimination among staff and between
patients and staff is a continuing problem for healthcare
organizations.107 Racial discrimination in the workplace increases
physician turnover and decreases physician morale.108 Research also
shows that the healthcare system systematically discriminates against
102. See Jessica H. May et al., Hospitals’ Responses to Nurse Staffing Shortages,
HEALTH AFF. 316–23 (June 26, 2006), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/
pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.25.w316.
103. See Jilian Mincer, Short on Staff: Nursing Crisis Strains U.S. Hospitals, REUTERS
(Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-healthcare-nursing/shorton-staff-nursing-crisis-strains-u-s-hospitals-idUSKBN1CP0BD
[https://perma.cc/
7M2M-CR3U] (“The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates there will be more than a
million registered nurse openings by 2024, twice the rate seen in previous
shortages.”); The Doctor is Out: 4 Ways to Fill Staffing Gaps in Health Care, HEALTHCARE
BUS. & TECH. (Nov. 22, 2016), http://www.healthcarebusinesstech.com/fill-staffinggaps-healthcare/ [https://perma.cc/EY2T-JN3Y] (“The nation will likely have
61,700 to 94,700 fewer doctors than necessary by 2025.”).
104. See Constance Newman, Time to Address Gender Discrimination and Inequality
in the Health Workforce, 12 HUM. RESOURCES HEALTH 25, 25 (2014).
105. See Lisa Ryan, Gender Pay Gaps in Hospital Medicine, HOSPITALIST (Feb. 2012),
https://www.the-hospitalist.org/hospitalist/article/125408/gender-pay-gaps-hospi
tal-medicine [http://perma.cc/BRK6-E428] (noting that a female physician left her
job at a hospital after learning that a less-experienced male physician was earning
$10,000 more annually than she was earning, stating that “the job was no longer
interesting”).
106. See, e.g., Carrie Teegardin et al., License to Betray, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (July 6,
2017), http://doctors.ajc.com/doctors_sex_abuse/?ecmp=doctorssexabuse_micro
site_nav [http://perma.cc/U2C9-DY5B].
107. See, e.g., Michael O. Schroeder, Racial Bias in Medicine Leads to Worse Care for
Minorities, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 11, 2016, 10:13 AM),
https://health.usnews.com/health-news/patient-advice/articles/2016-02-11/racia
l-bias-in-medicine-leads-to-worse-care-for-minorities
[https://perma.cc/M68ZQLCM].
108. See Marcella Nunez-Smith et al., Health Care Workplace Discrimination and
Physician Turnover, 101 J. NAT’L MED. ASS’N 1274, 1274 (2009).
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patients of color due to structural bias.109 And patients may
discriminate against doctors as well, sometimes believing that they
will receive better care from white doctors.110
Finally, staff may face workplace harassment and violence.111
Given the physical and emotional nature of healthcare
provider-patient relationships, the risk for harassment and violence
is greater in the healthcare setting than in the average workplace.112
For an extreme example, in 2017, a disgruntled former physician
Henry Bello opened fire at Bronx-Lebanon Hospital in New York
City, killing one and wounding six others before he shot himself.113
Patients are the largest perpetrators of violence against staff in the
healthcare workplace.114 Family members of patients may also
threaten or commit acts of violence against staff. In 2015, Stephen
Pasceri—dissatisfied with cardiovascular surgeon Dr. Michael J.
Davidson’s care of Pasceri’s mother—arrived at Brigham and
Women’s Hospital in Boston and shot Dr. Davidson and then
himself.115
2. Short-Term Mass Casualty Emergencies
Short-term mass casualty events—such as disease pandemics,
natural disasters, gun violence, and terrorism—are the risks to
healthcare organizations that often receive the most public

109. Ruqaiijah Yearby, When is a Change Going to Come?: Separate and Unequal
Treatment in Health Care Fifty Years after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 67 SMU
L. REV. 287, 293 (2014).
110. See Kimani Paul-Emile et al., Dealing with Racist Patients, 374 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 708, 708 (2016).
111. See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., WORKPLACE VIOLENCE IN
HEALTHCARE: UNDERSTANDING THE CHALLENGE 2 (2015) [hereinafter WORKPLACE
VIOLENCE].
112. Id. at 1.
113. Ralph Ellis et al., Doctor Fatally Shoots 1, Wounds 6 at NYC Hospital Before
Killing Himself, CNN (July 1, 2017, 10:41 AM), http://www.cnn.com/
2017/06/30/us/new-york-hospital-shooting/index.html [https://perma.cc/4CAVHEUY].
114. WORKPLACE VIOLENCE, supra note 111, at 2.
115. Felice J. Freyer et al., Surgeon Slain, Gunman Found Dead in Day of Crisis at
Brigham, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/
metro/2015/01/20/boston-police-investigate-report-shooting-brigham-and-wom
en/Jhig9z8LO8A5PH9Er4vTiP/story.html [https://perma.cc/L985-A5S2].
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attention.116 Though rare, catastrophic events can dwarf the impact
of all other risks that a healthcare organization faces.117
The recent Ebola crisis in West Africa demonstrates the panic
that can spread in the wake of a disease pandemic.118 While
healthcare providers face risks associated with health workers
returning from pandemics elsewhere,119 they also must plan for the
likelihood of a future disease outbreak at home.120 The sudden strain
on resources, along with mass panic, can overwhelm providers.121
Increasingly, natural disasters are also causing healthcare
organizations to struggle with sudden and unexpected influxes of
patients.122 Even heavy winter storms force hospitals to release all
patients who can be released in anticipation of low staff and

116. See, e.g., Rachel Bishop, A&E Nurse Reveals Horror that Unfolded as Manchester
Terror Attack Victims Rushed to Hospital, MIRROR (May 24, 2017, 5:12 PM),
https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/ae-nurse-reveals-horror-unfolded-10491
290 [https://perma.cc/22VU-9AYY]; Helen Branswell, A Severe Flu Season is
Stretching Hospitals Thin. That is a Very Bad Omen, STAT (Jan. 15, 2018),
https://www.statnews.com/2018/01/15/flu-hospital-pandemics/ [https://perm
a.cc/5PCX-APM2]; Ana B. Ibarra, Hospitals’ Best-Laid Plans Upended by Disaster,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 24, 2018), https://khn.org/news/hospitals-best-laidplans-upended-by-disaster/ [https://perma.cc/FMV9-PEPG].
117. See generally Mahshid Abir et al., Effect of a Mass Casualty Incident: Clinical
Outcomes and Hospital Charges for Casualty Patients Verses Concurrent Inpatients, 19 ACAD.
EMERGENCY MED. 280 (2012) (discussing how mass casualty incidents can negatively
affect outcomes for other patients); Soumya Karlamangla, As Health Workers Deal with
Mass Shootings and Fires, More Hospitals are Looking to Help Them Cope, L.A. TIMES (Jan.
2, 2018, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-ln-code-comp
assion-20180102-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/6E48-ANVJ].
118. See Marc Santora, New Jersey Accepts Rights for People in Quarantine to End Ebola
Suit, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/
nyregion/new-jersey-accepts-rights-for-people-in-quarantine-to-end-ebola-suit.html
[https://perma.cc/S38Y-NCSG].
119. See, e.g., Joel Achenbach et al., American Doctor Infected with Ebola Returns to
U.S., WASH. POST (Aug. 2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
health-science/us-confirms-2-americans-with-ebola-coming-home-for-treatment/20
14/08/01/c20a27cc-1995-11e4-9e3b-7f2f110c6265_story.html [https://perma.cc/
3CCV-NLWE].
120. See generally WORLD HEALTH ORG., HOSPITAL PREPAREDNESS FOR EPIDEMICS
(2014) (discussing how hospitals can prepare for epidemics).
121. See, e.g., Amanda MacMillan, Hospitals Overwhelmed by Flu Patients are Treating
Them in Tents, TIME (Jan. 18, 2018), http://time.com/5107984/hospitals-handlingburden-flu-patients/ [https://perma.cc/WVV6-8XSR].
122. See Ibarra, supra note 116.
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weather-related accidents, and to find places to house necessary
personnel during the storms.123
Areas with greater poverty are typically hit the hardest by natural
disasters.124 Governmental and charitable assistance is critical in
evacuating patients and getting providers up and running after
storms, as vulnerable communities lack the resources to shore up
their own healthcare institutions.125 For example, in Puerto Rico,
Hurricane Maria continues to disrupt healthcare months later.126
The long-term loss of power, clean water, and useable roads has cost
facilities the ability to properly care for patients and prevented
patients from being able to reach these facilities.127 Needs changed
in the aftermath of the hurricane. Mold from damaged structures
resulted in respiratory ailments, and people needed vaccinations for
tetanus.128 Doctors began fleeing the island because they had the
means to do so, which resulted in staffing shortages.129 This is an apt
example of the synergistic reaction of one risk when it is exposed to
accelerators. The accelerator (the hurricane) increases other risks
(staffing risks), which in turn might worsen the effect of the
accelerator risk.
There are also the economic losses from natural disasters. For
example, Hurricane Harvey caused about $460 million in losses

123. Lindsay Kalter, Kalter: Hospitals Prepare for Foul Weather, BOS. HERALD (Jan.
4, 2018), http://www.bostonherald.com/news/columnists/lindsay_kalter/2018/
01/kalter_hospitals_prepare_for_foul_weather [https://perma.cc/R5SB-TBTV].
124. See Gabriela Meléndez Olivera, Hurricane Maria Exposed the U.S.’s Long
Neglect of Puerto Rico, ACLU (Dec. 11, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/
human-rights/hurricane-maria-exposed-uss-long-neglect-puerto-rico [https://per
ma.cc/KMK6-DWR2].
125. See Gillian B. White, A Long Road Home, ATLANTIC (Aug. 3, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/08/hurricane-katrina-sandydisaster-recovery-/400244/ [https://perma.cc/52Z7-KVDH] (discussing how
impoverished areas are hardest hit by natural disasters).
126. See Shanoor Seervai, How Hurricane Maria Worsened Puerto Rico’s Health Care
Crisis, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Dec. 18, 2017), http://www.commonwea
lthfund.org/publications/features/2017/puerto-rico-health-care-crisis [https://
perma.cc/765Z-CV89].
127. Michael Joe Murphy, Commentary: Puerto Rico Health Care under
‘Unimaginable’ Stress after Hurricane Maria, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Dec. 19, 2017),
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/os-ed-puerto-rico-health-care-scramble
s-after-hurricane-interview-20171218-story.html [https://perma.cc/RNZ8-AVYD].
128. Id.
129. See Olivera, supra note 124.
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across ninety-two Texas hospitals.130 Roughly $380 million of those
losses came from structural damages; another $40 million came from
“uncompensated care costs attributable to the storm and its
aftermath”; and approximately $48 million came from “business
office closures, billing and claims disruption, delayed or unpaid
insurance claims and more.”131 Not-for-profit hospitals sought
reimbursement from the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
but for-profit hospitals were left without this assistance.132
Staff may also be impacted by natural disasters as they may lose
homes and worry about family members while trying to work.133
Increasing numbers of these events can result in mental health issues
for hospital staff and administrators.134 This is an example of a risk
(poor staff mental health) that is increased as a result of another
“accelerator” risk (a mass-casualty event), that can in turn enhance
both the first risk (poor staff mental health) while increasing the
dangers associated with the accelerator risk (poor patient care
during the mass casualty event). Staff can even have their own health
impacted directly by the disaster. For example, poor air quality from
the recent California wildfires impacted both hospital staff and
patients alike.135
D.

Building Consensus

Environmental regulators and stakeholders built a consensus
around the need for cumulative risks assessments because while
considering risks in isolation makes assessments easier, it does not
accurately assess the risks faced by a population.136 People in the real
world may be exposed to multiple chemicals at the same time. They
130. Susannah Luthi, Disaster Aid Coming Piecemeal to Hard-Hit Hospitals, MODERN
HEALTHCARE (Dec. 15, 2017), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/
20171215/NEWS/171219909 [https://perma.cc/G7VE-4EXD].
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See Henry Thomas, Hospitals Must be Mindful of their Obligations to
Employees During Natural Disasters, CAL. HEALTHCARE NEWS (Dec. 5, 2017),
http://www.cahcnews.com/articles/12-2017/ca-hthomas-1217.php [https://perm
a.cc/AP25-TZWK].
134. Karlamangla, supra note 117.
135. Soumya Karlamangla, Southern California’s Hospitals Prepare for the Worst as
Embers Ignite Throughout the Region, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2017, 11:20 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-wildfires-air-quality-hospitals-2017
1208-story.html [perma.cc/8G6D-94P4].
136. See, e.g., RISK ASSESSMENT FORUM, supra note 15, at 30.
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may also be exposed to numerous non-chemical stressors such as
poverty, aging parents, and many other stressors that change the
impact that those chemicals would otherwise have on their bodies.137
Similarly, hospital patients and staff are exposed to both
stressors inherent in their roles at the hospital and to stressors
related to their lives outside the hospital. Yet the risk assessments
performed by healthcare organizations fail to evaluate the full
picture when they address only some of the risks and only in
isolation. Providers need to better understand what non-economic
risks they and their patients, staff, and visitors face. They also need
to know if a sub-population is particularly vulnerable to those risks.
IV. MANAGING CUMULATIVE RISKS IN HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS
The three phases of a cumulative risk assessment set forth in the
EPA’s Framework—“(1) planning, scoping, and problem
formulation, (2) analysis, and (3) risk characterization”138 —can also
be applied by healthcare organizations. First, risk managers and
stakeholders should address the goals and scope of the assessment.
Given that cumulative risk assessments should not merely be laundry
lists of every possible risk faced by everyone who sets foot in a
healthcare facility, the key part of this first step is to decide which
piece of the puzzle to analyze.139 Is a particular risk assessment
intended to address all risks faced by emergency room patients, with
a focus on a particular accelerator such as short-term mass casualty
emergencies? Or is it to focus on a particular negative impact the
group wants to investigate, such as high blood pressure among
certain patients under care, or long wait times for patients with
certain injuries/conditions? Or should the focus be on a particularly
vulnerable population? The analysis plan will set out what data is
needed and how to obtain it.140 Patient and/or staff questionnaires
137. Ari S. Lewis et al., Non-Chemical Stressors and Cumulative Risk Assessment: An
Overview of Current Initiatives and Potential Air Pollutant Interactions, 8 INT. J. ENVTL.
RES. PUB. HEALTH 2020–21 (2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC3138011/ [https://perma.cc/8PHS-L7BD].
138. See RISK ASSESSMENT FORUM, supra note 15, at xviii.
139. See id. at 14 (discussing the planning and scoping phase of a cumulative risk
assessment).
140. These questions show that during this phase, a decision should be made
about whether to use stressor-based (“bottom-up”) methods to ask: “what health
effects are related to a defined set of stressors” or effects-based (“top-down”)
methods to ask “retrospectively . . . which stressors explain observed or hypothesized

2018]

MANAGING CUMULATIVE RISK IN HEALTHCARE

1305

may be an important component of data gathering, as will
information on the population in question, which may be obtained
from state and local public health agencies.
In the analysis phase of the assessment, the main work is
evaluating the interactions between and among the stressors
identified in the first phase and then using that evaluation to predict
risks for the population and any relevant sub-populations.141
Information uncertainties and missing data will mean that this stage
may include quantitative or qualitative analysis, or some mixture of
both. Even anecdotal evidence may support action by a healthcare
organization to change policies and procedures.142 The result of this
phase should be gathering information necessary to determine
where there are red flags indicating potential high risks. When
determining interactions, special attention must be paid to
accelerators and whether and how they operate synergistically to
increase risk.
Last, in the risk characterization phase, the risks identified in
the analysis phase are placed in context by comparing them to other
risks that require resources at the organization and determining
whether the quantitative and qualitative data analyzed are sufficient
to conclude that resources should be used to address a particular
risk.143 The organization will have to make choices that include
whether to prioritize risks based on likelihood of occurrence or
potential impact assuming occurrence. All employees of a healthcare
organization must participate in managing and mitigating risks.144

health effects in a population or community.” Sexton, supra note 18, at 379.
141. See RISK ASSESSMENT FORUM, supra note 15, at 34 (discussing the analysis
phase of a cumulative risk assessment).
142. Cf. Amy Donahue & Robert Tuohy, Lessons We Don’t Learn: A Study of the
Lessons of Disasters, Why We Repeat Them, and How We Can Learn Them, J. NPS CTR. FOR
HOMELAND DEF. & SEC. (July 2006), https://www.hsaj.org/articles/167
[https://perma.cc/T4XL-MMDW] (citing many instances of anecdotal evidence to
illustrate the need to learn from specific experiences, for example, the Columbine
Massacre and the immediate nationwide changes to S.W.A.T. protocol).
143. See RISK ASSESSMENT FORUM, supra note 15, at 59 (discussing the last phase
of cumulative risk assessment, risk characterization).
144. Dorfschmid & Forman, supra note 67, at 20 (“Addressing compliance risks
is not solely the responsibility of the compliance officer.”).
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V. CONCLUSION
Current risk assessments by healthcare organizations are
typically deficient because they fail to consider cumulative risk. The
environmental law and regulatory community has reached
consensus on the importance of assessing cumulative risk for public
health. Yet, healthcare providers continue to assess risks in isolation.
The time has come to focus on cumulative risks to health, even if
there are uncertainties based on the unpredictability of human
behavior and lack of data. Building a consensus on the need for
cumulative risk assessment by healthcare organizations will show the
need for additional tools and data. Even if uncertainties remain,
evaluating cumulative risk and understanding how individual risks
may interact with each other will lead to safer conditions for
employees and patients alike.
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